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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the incentives of an incumbent and an entrant to migrate from an
“old” technology to a “new” technology, and discuss how the terms of wholesale access affect
this migration. We show that a higher access charge on the legacy network pushes the entrant
firm to invest more, but has an ambiguous effect on the incumbent’s investments, due to two
conflicting effects: the wholesale revenue effect, and the business migration effect. If both the
old and the new infrastructures are subject to ex-ante access regulation, we also find that the
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1 Introduction
Infrastructure investments are crucial in network industries for the provision of final services of
adequate quantity and quality. In these industries, such investments are highly influenced by
regulatory interventions that might undermine or enhance companies’ incentives to invest.1 The
typical regulatory instrument adopted to sustain market competition at the retail level is to mandate
access to existing (essential) infrastructures, mainly operated and maintained by incumbent firms.
While access regulation plays a fundamental role in promoting competition in the short-run, it can
also have a significant impact on an incumbent’s incentives to upgrade its infrastructure. It can
also impact all firms’ incentives to invest in new alternative infrastructures,2 and hence, impact the
transition from old technology infrastructures to new ones
The transition from “old” to “new” infrastructures often does not happen instantaneously. In
the broadband telecoms industry, for example, the evidence suggests a rather slow transition from
the old (copper) to the new (fiber) generation networks. In such instances, the transition phase
is characterized by the co-existence of different generation infrastructures, where the investment
incentives are shaped not only by the terms of access to the existing infrastructure, but also by those
to the new infrastructure. Such an interplay between—potentially different sets of—terms of access to
the existing network and to the new network has been overlooked in the recent literature, where the
main focus has been on the impact of access regulation (of either old or of new infrastructures) on
the investments. While the settings with a such focus are most appropriate for the industries where
the new technologies replace the old technology instantaneously, they are not suitable for addressing
interesting research questions in industries where different generations of technologies remain in co-
existence—at least during the transition phase. The main question we address in this paper is as
1For a general overview of the relationship between regulation and investment, see Guthrie (2006).
2See Valletti (2003) for the review of the theoretical literature, and see Cambini and Jiang (2009) for a more
recent and comprehensive survey.
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follows: How does the presence of access requirements on both old and new infrastructures affect
the incentives (of both the owner of the legacy network and the entrant firm) to invest in new
infrastructures? In the policy context, the question is the characterization of the access rules that
spur investments in new infrastructures while minimizing the distortion in allocative efficiency (in
the provision of services with the old network).
In the stream of literature to which we aim to contribute, the majority of papers fall into either
one of the two groups. One set of papers consider only the entrant firm as a potential investor, and
therefore, study the impact of access regulation (to the incumbent’s network) only on the entrant’s
incentives to invest.3 Another set of papers considers both the entrant and the incumbent firms’
incentives to invest, but nevertheless ignore the migration issue.4 This latter set of papers mainly
explore the optimal access scheme in terms of the timing of investments, where the investment
decisions are “zero-one” in nature. Various recent studies, namely, Klumpp and Su (2010), Nitsche
and Wiethaus (2010), and Brito et al. (2010a), also address the problem of investment and access
regulation in a different vein, and yet, neglect the effect of migration from old to new infrastructures
and how access regulation affects the decision to enter into one segment of the market. Brito et
al. (2010b), which is the most similar paper to ours, focuses on the nature of innovation (which
can be either drastic or non-drastic) and considers a new technology that is not subject to access
regulation.
Our paper differs from the previous studies in several directions. We consider a setting where
3See for example, Bourreau and Dog˘an (2005), (2006) and Avenali et al. (2010). The latter two papers suggest
that access pricing that increases over time would give the entrants the proper incentives to invest in alternative
technologies in a timely manner.
4See Gans and Williams (1999), Gans (2001), (2007), Hori and Mizuno (2006) and Vareda and Hoernig (2010)
for the impact of access prices in a dynamic investment race between two operators. These studies show that the
regulator’s capacity to make credible commitments is important for firms’ investment decisions. When the regulator
lacks credibility, Foros (2004) shows that the difference in firms’ abilities to provide value added services can be the
major determinant in investment incentives. When there is no credibility issue, Kotakorpi (2006) shows that the
presence of spillovers reduces the incumbent’s incentives, which leads to a level of investment, which is not only below
the socially optimal level, but also less than the amount in the absence of regulation.
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access to an existing old technology is available everywhere within a country, and an incumbent
and an entrant compete for providing retail (broadband) services to consumers. In our setting,
the country is composed of a continuum of areas, in which the fixed cost of rolling-out the new
technology network varies. We first analyze the firms’ (both entrant and incumbent) incentives to
invest in new technology in different areas of the country, as a function of the access price of the
existing network. Then, we consider the case in which access obligation also applies to the new
network (possibly with different terms).
Three conflicting effects emerge in this setting: (i) when the access price for the existing in-
frastructure is low (i.e., when the entrant’s opportunity cost of investment is high) it kicks in the
so-called replacement effect5 and hinders infrastructure investment by alternative operators; (ii) in
the presence of a positive spillover of new investments, a higher access price increases the incum-
bent’s opportunity cost of investment due to the wholesale revenue effect (if the incumbent invests
in a higher quality network, the entrant will invest in reaction, and the incumbent will then lose
some wholesale profits); and finally (iii) when the access price of the legacy network is low, the
prices for the services which rely on this network are low, hence, in order to encourage customers
to switch from the old network to the new network, operators should also offer low prices. This
effect, which we refer to as the business migration effect, reduces the profitability of the new tech-
nology infrastructure, and hence the incentives to invest in it. The coexistence of these multiple
effects creates a non-monotonic relationship between the access price and investments in the new
technology (i.e., in the coverage of the new network).
We also study the effects that emerge when both the old and new infrastructures are subject
to ex-ante intervention. Our analysis shows that extending regulation to the new infrastructure
5This effect implies that, everything else constant, a monopoly firm is argued to have lower incentives to invest in
drastic innovations than a competitive firm, as it involves “replacing itself.” See Bourreau et al. (2010) for a general
description of this effect in the telecom industry.
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negatively affects investments. More interestingly, our results highlight that regulators must not
treat the decisions regarding the two access prices (to the old and to the new infrastructures)
independently. We find that the socially optimal access price of the new network increases with the
access price of the legacy network when the incumbent has a larger NGN coverage than the entrant,
whereas the opposite can be true if the entrant has a larger NGN coverage than the incumbent.
While overlooked in the theoretical literature, the migration issue has recently received consid-
erable attention in the policy arena, where the proposals made by the market specialists appear
to be in sharp contrast to one another. For example, in a recent report prepared by WIK (2011)
for the European Competitive Telecommunication Association (ECTA), WIK proposes to decrease
the access price to legacy (copper) networks to encourage entrants to invest in new (fiber) net-
works, and to allow a rapid switch-off of the copper networks where the fiber is already installed.
In contrast to WIK (2011), the report prepared by Plum (2011) for the European (incumbent)
Telecommunications Network Operators (ETNO) states that a lower copper price would discour-
age investments to next-generation access networks by encouraging customers to stay on copper,
thereby negatively impacting the fiber business case. Moreover, Plum proposes to set a direct link
between the regulated access price of the legacy network and the regulated access price on the new
network. Both documents show that not only do the access prices of the high-tech infrastructure
have an impact on the incentive to invest in the new network, but also the access price to the
old (legacy) network has a major influence on the transition to the new networks. However, the
direction of this link is still unclear and not theoretically based.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe our benchmark model
(with no access obligations on the new network). We solve the model in Section 3. In Section 4,
6See also the recent EU Recommendation C(2010) 6223 on “Regulated Access to NGANs” (September 2010),
which states that the regulatory policies during the migration phase can be fundamental in determining the incentives
to invest in new infrastructures. However, the legislation is completely silent on the potential interplay between the
access remedies in both old and new networks.
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we extend our analysis to consider the interplay between access regulation of both old and new
networks. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 The Setting
There are two firms, an incumbent (firm 1) and an entrant (firm 2). At the beginning of the
game, both firms rely on the incumbent’s old generation network (OGN) to provide their services.
The entrant’s access to the OGN is regulated with the per-unit access price .7 Then, both firms
sequentially decide on their investments in the next generation network (NGN).8 In our benchmark
model, we consider the case where the incumbent moves first. This assumption reflects the fact
that the incumbent firm typically faces some specific advantages due to its control over the existing
infrastructure and ducts that facilitate the deployment of the new infrastructure.9 When a firm
invests in the NGN, it no longer employs the OGN to provide its services (i.e., the NGN technology
replaces that of the OGN).
Investment costs We consider a country, composed of a continuum of areas, with a total size
of . We assume that the fixed cost of rolling out the NGN varies in different areas of the country,
and we order the areas (from 0 to ) so that the ranking reflects the order of the magnitude of
NGN investment costs (from low to high) .
For each firm,  = 1 2, the decision to invest in the NGN involves setting the areas,  ∈ [0 ],
in which the NGN will be rolled-out.
7 In the broadband telecommunications market, OGN would be the copper network, whereas NGN would be the
fiber network. Prior to investing in NGNs, the entrant firms often rely on the incumbents’ local copper networks
(possibly through a local loop unbundling offer) to provide their services.
8See Bourreau, Cambini and Hoernig (2011), for a “coverage game,” where the investment decisions are made
simultaneously.
9Note that, the incumbent moves first in terms of deciding which areas of the country it invests in the NGN. The
entrant may end up investing “first” in the NGN in a given geographical area if the incumbent decides not to invest
in that area. We also verified that our the qualitative nature of our results remain unchanged when the entrant moves
first. unchanged (the computations for this extension are available upon request). Since the “spillover effect” is an
important feature of our model, we consider a sequential game rather than a simultaneous one.
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The fixed cost of covering an area at a given location,  ∈ [0 ], for firm 1, is denoted by 1 (),
with 1 ()  0 and 01 ()  0. The total cost of covering the area [0 1] for firm 1 is then
1 (1) =
1Z
0
1 () ,
and we have  01 (1) = 1 (1)  0 and  001 (1) = 01 (1)  0.
The fixed cost of covering an area at a given location,  ∈ [0 ], for firm 2 is
2 ( 1) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 () if   1
1 ()  (1 + ) if  ≤ 1
,
with  ≥ 1 and  ∈ [0+∞) 
The parameter  represents any cost-disadvantage the entrant might have.10 The parameter 
allows for spillovers from the incumbent’s investments; the entrant’s fixed cost of investing in the
NGN may be lower in the areas where the incumbent has already rolled-out its NGN than in those
where an NGN is absent.11 A higher  represents a higher degree of (positive) spillovers, whereas
 = 0 corresponds to the case with no spillovers. The total cost of covering the area [0 2] for firm
2 is then
2 (2 1) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
1 (2)  (1 + ) if 2 ≤ 1
1 (2)−  (1 + )1 (1) if 2  1
We have 22  0 and 22 (2)2  0, that is, the entrant’s total investment is strictly convex
with respect to the size of the areas covered. We also have 21 ≤ 0 (due to the spillover effect).
10 In the broadband setting, the incumbent firms may have lower investment costs than the entrant firms due to
their control over the legacy (copper) network infrastructure and other essential inputs (e.g., civil works).
11For example, when the incumbent builds an NGN in a given zone, it may have to obtain administrative autho-
rizations, to gather information on existing civil works or paths of way, etc., which generates some administrative
and contractual costs. When the entrant decides to roll-out its own NGN in the same area, its investment costs can
be lower if it can benefit from the incumbent’s earlier efforts. One could also consider informational spillovers, as
well as direct cost savings due to infrastructure sharing.
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Profits We denote the profit of firm  = 1 2 in a given area by  , where   =  refer
to the network technology (OGN or NGN) of firms 1 and 2, respectively. We assume that the
firms’ profits in a given area depend on their respective network technologies, and not on their
total coverage of the NGN in the country.12 In particular, we consider that firms can set different
prices in different areas according to their network technology and that of their rival.13 Finally, we
normalize the marginal cost of access to 0.
We introduce the following assumptions on profits.14
Assumption 1 For  =  , we have (i) 2 ()  ≤ 0; (ii) for  =  , there exists
b  0 such that, for all  ≤ b, 1 ()  ≥ 0, and 1 ()  ≤ 0 otherwise.
Assumption 1(i) states that when the entrant relies on the OGN to provide its services, its profit
decreases with the access price, . Assumption 1(ii) means that the incumbent’s profit increases
with the access price, but only up to a certain level of access price. The threshold b corresponds
to the monopoly access price when the incumbent operates a network of technology  =  .
Assumption 2 For  =  and all  ≤ b, 1 () ≥ 1 .
Assumption 2 implies that, given its network technology, firm 1 makes more profit when firm 2
uses the OGN than when firm 2 invests in the NGN.
Assumption 3 We have 1  2 ()  0, which implies that two technologies can co-exist.
In the benchmark setting, we ignore the possibility of access provision by the NGN owner, and
12Although it is not our focus in this paper, the size of the total coverage might indirectly affect the market demand
in a given area. In the broadband context, for example, larger coverage of the NGN might stimulate innovation in
contents that are suited for NGNs only, which would in turn increase the demand for NGNs in any given area.
13Assuming uniform pricing for the OGN services and the NGN services (of each firm) would complexify the
analysis, as the firms’ pricing strategies would then depend on their coverage decisions. Since we aim at providing
an analysis with general profit functions, we ignore the possibility of uniform pricing.
14 In Appendix A, we provide an example of a competitive setting à la Katz and Shapiro (1985), with quality
differentiation and quantity competition, that satisfies the assumptions we list below.
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focus on the relationship between the OGN access regulation and investment incentives.15
Timing of the game The timing of the game is as follows: The regulator sets the access
price on the OGN, . Then, firm 1 decides on the areas in which to roll-out the NGN, 1. Finally,
observing firm 1’s decision, firm 2 decides on its own NGN coverage, 2.
We look for the subgame perfect equilibrium of this game.
3 The Equilibrium
In this Section, we solve the game backwards, starting with the last stage.
3.1 The entrant’s investment decision (Stage 3)
Assume that firm 1 has covered the areas [0 1]. Firm 2’s profit writes
Π2 = −2 (2 1) +
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
22 + (1 − 2)2 () + ( − 1)2 () if 2 ≤ 1
12 + (2 − 1)2 + ( − 2)2 () if 2  1
(1)
In order to determine firm 2’s optimal investment, first, consider the case where firm 2 covers an
area where firm 1 has already rolled out its NGN (i.e., 2 ≤ 1). It is profitable for firm 2 to invest
in an area 2 ∈ [0 1] if the extra gross profit it earns by investing in an NGN is higher than the
investment cost in this area, that is, if
2 − 2 () ≥ 2 (2 1) = 1 (2)  (1 + ) . (2)
15 In Section 4, we study the interplay between access to the OGN and access to the incumbent’s NGN.
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The same reasoning applies when firm 2 decides to cover an area 2, where firm 1 has not rolled-out
its NGN (i.e., 2  1). It is profitable for firm 2 to invest in this area if
2 − 2 () ≥ 2 (2 1) = 1 (2) . (3)
Let 2 () and 2 () be defined as the highest value of 2 that satisfy inequalities (2) and (3),
respectively. In each respective case, 2 () and 2 () represent the largest area in which firm 2
invests. We have
2 () = (1)−1
³
(1 + )
³
2 − 2 ()
´.

´
,
and
2 () = (1)−1
³³
2 − 2 ()
´.

´

In the equilibrium of this stage, for any given ,16 we either have 2  2 , or the reverse. In
the former case, for a given area, firm 2 has a higher incentive to invest in an NGN if firm 1 has
already invested in the given area than if it has not. The opposite is true for the latter case. As
the following Lemma implies, whether the former or the latter case applies in equilibrium depends
on the degree of spillovers, as well as the level of access price.
Lemma 1 For any given , there exists  () ∈ [0+∞) such that for all    (), we have
2 ()  2 ().
Proof. See Appendix B.
If the degree of spillovers is sufficiently large, then the “spillover effect” becomes operational,
and (for a given area) it gives firm 2 a greater incentive to invest in an NGN if the incumbent’s
16Note that both 2 and 2 are independent of 1.
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NGN is already rolled-out than when it is not.17 The threshold degree of spillovers above which
this effect is in force depends on the access price, . However, since both 2 () and 2 () are
decreasing with , its variation with respect to  is indeterminate, in general. Our computations
with quantity competition à la Katz and Shapiro (1985) show that  ()   0, i.e., a higher
access price makes the spillover effect less likely to be operational.18
Firm 2’s decision on its NGN investments are effected by whether the spillover effect is opera-
tional or not. Therefore, in studying firm 2’s coverage decision, we distinguish between two cases:
high degrees of spillovers (i.e.,    ()), and low degrees of spillovers (i.e.,  ≤  ()).
High degrees of spillovers (   ())
In this case, the spillover effect is in force. That is, we have 2  2 , and hence, firm 2 is not willing
to cover areas where firm 1 has not already rolled-out its NGN. The following Lemma describes
the best-response of the entrant.
Lemma 2 If    (), the best-response of the entrant writes:
BR2 (1) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
2 if 1 ≤ 2
1 if 2  1 ≤ 2
2 if 1  2
(4)
Proof. See Appendix C.
The entrant’s optimal coverage reads as follows. If firm 1’s NGN covers a relatively small part of
the country (i.e., 1 ≤ 2 ), firm 2 rolls out its NGN as if it had a monopoly over NGNs. Therefore,
firm 2 sets 2 = 2 . The entrant’s best response to greater coverage by the incumbent is to mimic
17With quantity competition à la Katz and Shapiro (1985), a strictly positive degree of spillover (i.e.,     0)
is required to obtain 2  2 .This is also true for competition à la Hotelling, as well as for the Mussa-Rosen model
of competition. See Lestage and Flacher (2010) for the computations regarding the latter.
18See Subsection 3.4 for the analysis in the Katz and Shapiro (1985) setting.
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the incumbent’s investment (i.e., 2 = 1). If the incumbent maintains sufficiently large NGN
coverage (i.e., 1  2), then firm 2 invests in less coverage than its rival. We also find that the
entrant’s best-response coverage increases with the incumbent’s coverage (hence, the incumbent’s
and the entrant’s coverage levels are strategic complements).
Low degrees of spillovers ( ≤  ())
In this case the degree of spillovers is sufficiently small (i.e.,  ≤  ()) so that the spillover effect
is not in force. The following Lemma describes the best-response of the entrant in this case.
Lemma 3 If  ≤  (), the best-response of the entrant writes:
BR2 (1) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
2 if 1 ≤ b1 ()
2 if 1  b1 () , (5)
where b1 () ∈ [2 2 ].
Proof. See Appendix D.
The threshold b1 () is defined as the lowest 1 such thatΠ2 (1 2) ≥ Π2 (1 2 ). The variations
of b1 () are indeterminate, and in our Katz and Shapiro example, we find that b1 () varies non-
monotonically with .
The entrant’s best-response (5) is similar to the case with high spillovers, except that BR2 (1)
decreases (weakly) with 1 when  ≤  (), as 2 ≤ 2 (and hence, the incumbent’s and the
entrant’s coverage levels are strategic substitutes).19 Firm 2 acts as a monopoly for the NGN
investments if firm 1’s coverage is sufficiently low. Otherwise, firm 2’s coverage choice depends on
its incentive to duplicate firm 1’s NGN. Different than the case with high degree of spillovers, in
19To see this, assume that firm 1 increases its coverage from 1 with 1 ≤ 1 to 01 with 01  1. Then, firm 2’s
coverage is reduced from 2 to 2.
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deciding on its coverage, firm 2 never mimics firm 1’s decision.
As the following Proposition states, for a given level of NGN coverage set by the incumbent,
the access price set for the incumbent’s legacy network affects the entrant’s choice for coverage.
Proposition 1 For a given level of NGN coverage, 1, set by the incumbent, a higher access price
implies a higher level of NGN coverage by the entrant.
Proof. We have
2
 =
1 + 
 (1)0
³
(1)−1
³
(1 + )(2 − 2 ())
´´ Ã−2 ()
!
.
Since 2 ()  ≤ 0 (due to Assumption 1), then 2 ≥ 0. Similarly, since 2 ()  ≤ 0,
we have
2
 =
1
 (1)0
³
(1)−1
³
2 − 2 ()
´´ Ã−2 ()
!
≥ 0.
Therefore, an increase in  shifts firm 2’s best-response functions (given by equations (4) and (5))
upward, which implies that for a given 1, firm 2 invests more.
This result highlights the first of the three effects we described earlier: the “replacement ef-
fect”:20 a higher  implies a lower opportunity cost (i.e., a lower 2 (), for  = ) of investing
in an NGN, which increases firm 2’s incentives to invest in NGN coverage.
3.2 The incumbent’s investment decision (Stage 2)
We now turn to firm 1’s investment decision, at stage 2 of the game. Since the best-response of
firm 2 in the presence of a high degree of spillovers (   ()) is different than with a low degree
of spillovers ( ≤  ()), we study firm 1’s decision in these two cases separately.
20The replacement effect has been introduced by Arrow (1962) in the innovation literature. Arrow shows that an
incumbent has less incentives to invest than an entrant as it “replaces” itself.
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High degrees of spillovers (   ())
To determine the incumbent’s optimal coverage decision, we begin by writing its profit function
when it anticipates the entrant’s best-response. Since BR2 (·)  defined in equation (4), has three
parts, we have to consider three possible cases, according to the value of 1. We have
Π1(1 BR2 (1)) = −1 (1)+
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
11 + (2 ()− 1)1 + ( − 2 ())1 () if 1 ∈ [0 2 ]
11 + ( − 1)1 () if 1 ∈ [2  2]
2 ()1 + (1 − 2 ())1 () + ( − 1)1 () if 1 ∈ [2 ]
For example, assume that 1 ∈ [0 2 ]. For  ∈ [0 1], both firm 1 and firm 2 have their NGNs
rolled-out, and hence, firm 1 obtains a profit 1 in this area. For  ∈ [1 2 ], only the entrant
has its NGN rolled-out, and therefore, in this area firm 1 earns the profit 1 from its legacy
network. Finally, for  ∈ [2  ], neither of the two firms have invested in the NGN, and hence, the
incumbent obtains 1 (). The profit of firm 1 for the other ranges of 1 can be read similarly.
The incumbent chooses a coverage 1 so as to maximize its profit, and hence, in equilibrium
firm 1 and firm 2’s coverage are given by
∗1 = arg max1∈[0]Π1(1 
BR
2 (1)) and ∗2 = BR2 (∗1) ,
respectively.
Let 1, 1 and 1 be the (interior) maxima of Π1(1 BR2 (1)) for 1 ∈ [0 2 ], 1 ∈ [2  2], and
1 ∈ [2 ], respectively.21 We have 1 = (1)−1
³
1 − 1
´
, 1 = (1)−1
³
1 − 1 ()
´
,
and 1 = (1)−1
³
1 ()− 1 ()
´
.22
21 In addition to these three potential interior optima, there are two potential corner optima, at 2 and 2.
22Note that under Assumption 2, we have 1 ≤ 1 () and 1 () ≥ 1 , which implies that 1 ≤ 1 and1 ≥ 1 . Therefore, there is a local optimum either at 1 or at 1.
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Access price and the equilibrium NGN coverage We now determine the relationship be-
tween the access price, , and the equilibrium NGN coverage of the incumbent. Below, we describe
the variation of the three potential interior optima, namely, 1, 1 and 1 , with respect to .
First, we have 1 = 0, which implies that if the incumbent invests strictly less than the
entrant in the equilibrium, its NGN coverage does not depend on the access price of the legacy
network. This is because, in the areas where the incumbent is going to invest, the entrant does not
rely on the legacy network, and does not pay the access charge.
Second, we have 1  0, for all  ≤ b.23 In this case, if the access price is not too high
(i.e., if it is not above the monopoly access price), increasing the access price makes the incumbent
invest less. This is due to the “wholesale revenue effect;” when the entrant does not invest in an
NGN, the incumbent enjoys wholesale revenues from its legacy network, and its profit, 1 (), is
increasing with the access price. To the extent that the incumbent’s investment favors the entrant’s
investment through the spillover effect, the incumbent faces an opportunity cost of rolling out its
NGN, namely, the foregone wholesale revenues. In other words, just like the entrant, the incumbent
faces a “replacement effect.”
Third, we have
1
 = 1 (1)
0
³
(1)−1
³
1 ()− 1 ()
´´Ã1 ()
 −
1 ()

!
.
Since (1)0 (·) ≥ 0, the sign of 1  is the same as the sign of 1 () −1 () . Under
our assumptions, we have 1 ()  ≥ 0 for all  ≤ b , and 1 ()  ≥ 0 for all  ≤ b.
Therefore, if  is not too high (i.e.,  ≤ min©bbª), the sign of 1  is indeterminate and
can be either positive or negative. This is due to the presence of two opposite effects: the wholesale
23Note that this is due to Assumption 1.
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revenue and business migration effects. First of all, due to the wholesale revenue effect, a higher 
implies a higher opportunity cost of investing in an NGN. Second, we outline a new but important
effect that we interpret as the “business migration effect,” which works in the opposite direction.
When the access price on the legacy network is low, the prices for the retail services which rely
on this network are low. Therefore, to encourage customers to switch from the legacy network to
the services provided with the NGN, firms need to offer lower prices for the NGN services. This,
in turn, reduces the profitability of the NGN, and hence, the incentives to invest in the NGN. To
our knowledge, this is the first time that this effect emerges due to the existence of two alternative
(“Old” and “New”) infrastructures, and this represents a key contribution of this paper.
According to our analysis, we have five potential equilibria: the three interior maxima and two
corner solutions.24 Table 1 presents each equilibrium, and summarizes the impact of the access
price on equilibrium investments. Each candidate equilibrium is characterized by one of the five
potential equilibrium NGN coverage of the incumbent (1, 2 , 1 , 2 and 1 ) and the entrant’s
best-response to the incumbent’s coverage, which is given by (4). We order the candidate equilibria
according to the total NGN coverage (from low to high).
Table 1: Candidate equilibria (high degrees of spillovers)
∗1 ∗2 comparison total coverage
{1 2 } ∅ + ∗1  ∗2 2
{2  2 } + + ∗1 = ∗2 2©1  1ª − − ∗1 = ∗2 1
{2 2} + + ∗1 = ∗2 2
{1  2} + or − + ∗1  ∗2 1
24Note that the equilibrium is unique, but that it can be either of the five equilibrium candidates.
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We find that three out of five equilibria involve symmetry in NGN coverage. In the asymmetric
equilibria, (i) if the incumbent invests less than the entrant, the entrant invests as if it were deploying
a monopolistic NGN infrastructure (i.e., we have ∗2 = 2 ), and (ii) if the incumbent invests more
than the entrant, the entrant mimics the incumbent’s coverage unless it is too large. Finally, if the
incumbent rolls out its NGN infrastructure massively, the entrant invests less than the incumbent.
Low degrees of spillovers ( ≤  ())
Given that BR2 (·) has two parts, we have two possible cases according to the value of 1. Firm 1’s
profit is given by
Π1(1 BR2 (1)) = −1 (1)+
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
11 + (2 ()− 1)1 + ( − 2 ())1 () if 1 ∈ [0 b1]
2 ()1 + (1 − 2 ())1 () + ( − 1)1 () if 1 ∈ [b1 ]
Since the incumbent’s profit function has two different parts, we have two potential interior
optima, 1 and 1 , that correspond to the maxima of Π1(1 BR2 (1)) for 1 ∈ [0 b1] and 1 ∈ [b1 ],
respectively.25
Access price and the equilibrium NGN coverage We list the potential equilibria and sum-
marize the relationship between the access price and the equilibrium coverage in Table 2 below.
Table 2: Candidate equilibria (low degrees of spillovers)
∗1 ∗2 comparison total coverage
{1 2 } ∅ + ∗1  ∗2 2
{b1 2 } + or − + ∗1  ∗2 2
{1  2} + or − + ∗1  ∗2 1
25Note that there is also a potential corner optimum at 1.
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The first and the last equilibrium candidates are also present in the case with a high degree of
spillovers. Differently, the equilibrium is never symmetric with a low degree of spillovers. This is
due to the fact that the spillover effect is not operational, and therefore the entrant never mimics
the incumbent coverage choice. Note however that all other effects (replacement, wholesale revenue,
and business migration effects) are still operational.
In Section 3.4, we adopt the competition model of Katz and Shapiro (1985), and describe the
equilibria for both cases.
3.3 The regulator’s decision (Stage 1)
The regulator chooses the access price on the old network, , so as to maximize social welfare,
which is defined as the sum of consumer surplus and industry profits. Let  denote the gross
welfare in an area where firm 1 uses technology  =  and firm 2 uses technology  =  .
We assume that  ()  ≤ 0. The idea is that when both firms use the old technology to
provide their services, a higher access price inflates the retail prices and reduces the total quantity
consumed.26
Since we have both symmetric and asymmetric candidate equilibria at the investment subgame
of our general setting, we first express the social welfare for each type of equilibrium. Then, we
discuss how welfare varies with the access price.
Symmetric equilibria
We denote the generic optimal coverage of the two firms in a symmetric equilibrium at the invest-
ment subgame by ∗1 = ∗2 = ∗. Social welfare then writes
 = ∗ () + ( − ∗ ()) ()− 1 (∗ ())− 2 (∗ ()  ∗ ()) .
26 In Appendix E, we provide the welfare analysis for our example setting and show that this assumption holds.
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The variation of welfare with respect to the access price is given by27

 =
∗ ()

£¡ −  ()¢− 1 (∗ ())− 2 (∗ ()  ∗ ())¤+ ( − ∗ ())  () . (6)
Equation (6) highlights the regulator’s potential trade-off between static efficiency and invest-
ment incentives. On the one hand, setting a higher access price lowers welfare in the uncovered
areas, as  ()  ≤ 0. On the other hand, a higher access price increases investment in-
centives if ∗ ()  ≥ 0, which is likely to be socially efficient.28 As shown in Table 1, in two
of the three symmetric equilibrium candidates, ∗ = 2 and ∗ = 2, we have ∗ ()  ≥ 0
Therefore, in this case the regulator faces a standard trade-off between investment incentives and
static efficiency in the uncovered areas.
This trade-off, however, is absent in the symmetric equilibrium candidate, with ∗ = 1 , where
the entrant mimics the incumbent’s investment decision. In contrast with the two other symmetric
equilibrium candidates, the objectives to provide strong investment incentives and to maximize
static efficiency in the uncovered areas are aligned in this equilibrium configuration. Setting a low
access price indeed stimulates investment (as it can be seen from Table 1, we have ∗ ()  =
1 ≤ 0), and it also increases welfare in the uncovered areas, as  ()  ≤ 0. In this
case, since  ≤ 0, the regulator has incentives to set a low access price.29
27Note that, as the access charge  varies, the actual equilibrium, which is always unique, can move from symmetric
equilibrium to asymmetric equilibrium, or vice versa.
28This is the case if
 − ()− 1 (∗ ())− 2 (∗ ()  ∗ ())  0. In our example setting, we show that
this inequality always holds, i.e., investment in NGN is always socially efficient (see Appendix E).
29When  decreases, the equilibrium can switch from this symmetric equilibrium with ∗ = 1 to another (symmet-
ric or asymmetric) equilibrium. Therefore, we cannot conclude that ∗ = 0 (that the access price is set at marginal
cost).
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Asymmetric equilibria
We have two candidate asymmetric equilibria, one in which the incumbent invests more than the
entrant, and one in which the opposite is true. We begin with the study of the equilibrium in which
the incumbent obtains larger NGN coverage than the entrant.
(i) ∗1  ∗2: The equilibrium NGN coverage for the incumbent and the entrant are 1 and 2,
respectively. Social welfare writes
 = 2 () + (1 − 2 ()) () + ( − 1 ) ()− 1 (1 )−2 (2 ()  1 ) 
We have

 =
2
|{z}
(+)
¡ −  ()− 2 (2 ()  1 )¢| {z }
(+) or (−)
+
1
|{z}
(+) or (−)
¡ ()− ()− 1 (1 )¢| {z }
(+) or (−)
(7)
+(1 − 2) 

| {z }
(−)
+ ( − 1 ) 

| {z }
(−)
.
When determining the access price, the regulator must take into account three different objectives.
First, it aims at maximizing static efficiency, which requires setting a low access price. This
corresponds to the last two (negative) terms in equation (7). Second, the regulator is concerned
about dynamic efficiency, that is, firms’ incentives to invest in NGN coverage. While raising the
access price always increases the entrant’s investment incentives (as 2 ()   0), it has an
ambiguous effect on the incumbent’s investment incentives (as it can be seen from Table 1, we
can have either 1 ()   0 or the opposite). Lastly, the regulator aims at avoiding excessive
duplication of infrastructure costs.
In our example setting, we find that the NGN coverage of the incumbent (in the areas with a
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single infrastructure) is too low from a social point view, whereas the NGN coverage of the entrant
(in the areas with two competing infrastructures) is too large.30 The intuition is that while firms
do not internalize all consumer surplus (and hence, might under-invest), their investment incentives
also involve a business-stealing effect (and hence, they might over-invest). Therefore, in this setting,
the regulator is willing to extend the incumbent’s NGN coverage by setting a lower or higher access
price (depending on whether we have 1 ()   0 or the opposite), and to reduce the entrant’s
coverage by setting a lower access price.
(ii) ∗1  ∗2: Now, consider the equilibria in which the entrant has larger NGN coverage than the
incumbent. We begin by studying the asymmetric equilibrium in which ∗1 = 1 and ∗2 = 2 ().
In this equilibrium, the social welfare writes
 = 1 + (2 ()− 1) + ( − 2 ()) ()− 1 (1)− 2 (2 ()  1) .
We have

 =
2 ()
| {z }
(+)
¡ −  ()− 2 (2 ()  1)¢| {z }
(+) or (−)
+ ( − 2 ()) 
 ()
| {z }
(−)
. (8)
Note that in this asymmetric equilibrium, the regulator does not take into account the incumbent’s
investment incentives in its choice of an access price, as 1 = 0.
If  − ()−2 (2 ()  1)  031 (which implies that the entrant’s NGN coverage is too
small from a social point of view), the regulator faces a trade-off between investment incentives and
static efficiency in the uncovered areas. On the one hand, setting a higher access price increases
30That is, we find that  () −  () − 1 (1 )  0, whereas  −  () − 2 (2 ()  1 )  0. See
Appendix E.
31 In our example setting, we find that  −  () − 2 (2 ()  1) can be either positive or negative. See
Appendix E.
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NGN coverage as 2 ()   0. On the other hand, it lowers welfare in the uncovered areas, as
 ()   0.
If  − ()− 2 (2 ()  1) ≤ 0, then we have  ≤ 0. Therefore, as the entrant is
going to invest too much from a social point of view, the regulator has incentives to set the lowest
access price possible to reduce both investment incentives and static inefficiency.
A similar analysis applies for the other asymmetric equilibrium candidate, where ∗1 = b1 and
∗2 = 2 (in the low spillovers case). This is because in this case the social welfare writes
 = b1 + (2 ()− b1) + ( − 2 ()) ()− 1 (b1)− 2 (2 ()  b1) ,
and hence,  is given by (8).
In the following section, we adopt the competitive setting of quantity competition with quality
differentiation of Katz and Shapiro (1985) and demonstrate the trade-offs involved in the NGN
investment decisions.
3.4 An example: competition à la Katz and Shapiro (1985)
The indirect utility function of a consumer of type  is  =  + − , where  and  denote the
quality and price of firm , with  = 1 2. Consumers’ types are uniformly distributed over [0 1].
Firms set quantities, and we normalize marginal costs to zero. We denote the quality of the OGN
by , and the quality of the NGN by  . Therefore, we have  =  or  , for  = 1 2. Finally,
we assume that    and that   1 + 2.32
In order to illustrate how the equilibrium coverage is determined by the degree of spillovers
and the investment cost disadvantage of the entrant, we adopt the following values for our model
32The latter assumption ensures that a firm using the old network is not evicted by a firm using the new network.
See Appendix A for a detailed analysis.
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parameters:  = 10,  = 1,  = 2,  = 0,33 and 1 () = 22, and depict the relationship in
Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Outcomes
The figure shows that for sufficiently low values of  (in this example, for  ∈ [1 165]), the
equilibrium is asymmetric. If the degree of spillovers is sufficiently low (below the solid line),
then the incumbent has larger NGN coverage than the entrant (i.e., we have ∗1  ∗2). In this
area, increasing the access price has an ambiguous effect on the incumbent’s investment, whereas
it increases the entrant’s investment. If the degree of spillovers is sufficiently high (above the
solid line), the entrant has larger NGN coverage than the incumbent. In this case, increasing the
access price enhances the entrant’s incentives for investment but it does not affect that of the
incumbent. For higher values of  (in this example, for   165) and high degrees of spillovers, the
equilibrium can be either symmetric or asymmetric: while the entrant obtains less NGN coverage
than the incumbent (and hence, an asymmetric equilibrium) if the degree of spillovers is low, it
invests in the same areas as the incumbent (symmetric equilibrium) if the degree of spillovers is
sufficiently large. The larger the cost disadvantage of the entrant, the higher the degree of spillovers
33That is, the access charge is equal to marginal cost.
23
that is required to obtain a symmetric coverage equilibrium (as the presence of a substantial cost
disadvantage plays against the entrant’s coverage). In the symmetric equilibrium, increasing the
access price enhances both firm 1’s and firm 2’s investment incentives.
Finally, increasing the access price shifts the solid line upwards, and hence, leads to the equi-
librium in which the incumbent invests in a larger NGN coverage than the entrant for larger values
of parameters  and .
Regulator’s decision
If the entrant has no cost disadvantage (i.e.,  = 1), the regulator sets the access price at marginal
cost for all values of the degree of spillovers. This is because, though the incumbent tends to invest
less as the degree of spillovers increases, the entrant invests massively in NGN coverage. Therefore,
the regulator can increase static efficiency without sacrificing larger NGN coverage. As Figure 2,
which depicts the optimal access price as a function of the degree of spillovers (for  = 1, 16, and
2), illustrates, this is no longer true when the entrant has a sufficiently high cost disadvantage.
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Figure 2: Socially optimal access charge
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If the incumbent reduces its NGN investment in the presence of high degrees of spillovers, the
entrant does not invest much either, as it faces high investment costs. This is why the regulator
should increase the access price on the OGN in order to provide both firms with stronger investment
incentives and counter-balance the spillover effect.
4 The interplay between the access regulations on the OGN and
on the NGN
In this section, we study the case where the NGN infrastructure is also subject to access regula-
tion and analyze the interplay between the regulation of the OGN and the NGN. We consider a
symmetric regulation of the NGN, i.e., both the incumbent and the entrant are required to provide
access to their NGN at a regulated price.34 We denote this regulated price at which the firms are
mandated to provide access to their NGN by e.
Let e (e) and  (e) denote firm ’s profit when it provides access to its NGN to firm  6= 
and firm ’s profit when it leases access from firm , respectively. We assume that e (e) e ≥ 0
for e that is not too high, and that  (e) e ≤ 0. In words, provided that the access price to
the NGN is not too high, the gross profits of the firm that owns the NGN is increasing with the
access price, whereas the opposite is true for the firm that acquires access.
Before determining the entrant’s and the incumbent’s investment decisions, we discuss under
which conditions technology migration occurs at the wholesale access level.
Migration at the wholesale level. First, consider the case where the incumbent has larger
NGN coverage than the entrant, and hence, it must provide access to its NGN in the areas where
34Access is required in the areas where the firm holds a monopoly in the NGN. For example, for a given location
where the incumbent has NGN coverage, the incumbent is required to provide to access to the entrant only if the
entrant has no NGN coverage in that area.
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the entrant has no coverage. When an NGN wholesale offer is available in a given area, the entrant
trades off between leasing access to the old technology network and leasing access to the NGN.
The entrant prefers to acquire access to the NGN rather than the OGN if and only if 2 (e) ≥
2 (). This condition, which we name the “wholesale migration condition,” can be rewritten as
e ≤ emax2 (), where emax2 ()  ≥ 0.35
The wholesale migration condition is a constraint that the regulator has to take into account
when setting the access prices both on the OGN and the NGN: if the access price for the OGN is
low, the regulator must also set a low access price on the incumbent’s NGN to make the entrant
switch from the legacy to the new network at the wholesale level. This fairly general condition
suggests that the regulator should seek a positive correlation between the access price of the OGN
and the access price of the NGN.
Second, consider the case where the entrant has larger NGN coverage than the incumbent. In a
given area where the entrant has NGN coverage but the incumbent does not, the incumbent leases
access to the entrant’s NGN if and only if 1 (e) ≥ 1 , that is, e ≤ emax1 .36
For the rest of the analysis, we assume that e ≤ min {emax1 emax2 ()}, that is, the regulated
access price of the NGN is not too high, so that there is access to the monopoly NGN infrastructures.
The entrant’s investment decision
Given firm 1’s coverage 1, firm 2’s profit writes
eΠ2 (1 2) = −2 (2 1) +
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
22 + (1 − 2)2 (e) + ( − 1)2 () if 2 ≤ 1
12 + (2 − 1) e2 (e) + ( − 2)2 () if 2  1
35This is because 2 () is a decreasing function and we also have 2 () decreasing with .
36Note that 1 () is decreasing with . Note also that max1 does not depend on , since the incumbent’s
internal transfer price equals marginal cost (i.e., it provides access to its own legacy network at marginal cost).
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As in Section 3, we define e2 and e2 as the values of 2 that maximize eΠ2 (1 2) for 2 ≤ 1 and
2  1, respectively. We have e2 (e) = (1)−1 ³(1 + ) ³2 − 2 (e)´.´ and e2 (e) =
(1)−1
³³e2 (e)− 2 ()´.´.
Due to the wholesale migration condition, we have 2 (e) ≥ 2 (), which implies that
e2 (e) ≤ 2 (). In other words, introducing an access offer on the monopoly NGN increases the
replacement effect for the entrant, which in turn decreases its investment incentives. Additionally,
we have e2 (e) ≤ 2 () if e2 (e) ≤ 2 , and the opposite otherwise. In our example setting,
we have e2 (e) ≤ 2 for all e ≤ emax1 , and hence e2 (e) ≤ 2 (). In the remainder of
the analysis, we focus on this case, where the introduction of an NGN wholesale offer reduces
investment incentives, because it lowers the profit of the firm which invests in NGN.
Finally, we have e2 (e) e, e2 (e) e, e2 (e)  ≥ 0. That is, increasing the access
price of the OGN or of the NGN increases NGN coverage.
The entrant’s optimal investment decision then writes
eBR2 (1) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
e2 if 1 ≤ e2 (e)
1 if e2 (e)  1 ≤ e2 (e)
e2 if 1  e2 (e)
and eBR2 (1) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎩
e2 if 1 ≤ e1 (e)
e2 if 1  e1 (e)
for e2  e2 and e2 ≤ e2 , respectively, where e1 (e) is the lowest 1 such that eΠ2 (1 e2 (e)) ≥
eΠ2 (1 e2 (e)) holds.
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The incumbent’s investment decision
The analysis is similar to that in Section 3. Consider the case where e2  e2 . Firm 1’s profit writes
eΠ1(1 eBR2 (1)) = −1 (1)+
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
11 + (e2 − 1)1 (e) + ( − e2 )1 () if 1 ∈ [0 e2 ]
11 + ( − 1)1 () if 1 ∈ [e2  e2]
e21 + (1 − e2) e1 (e) + ( − 1)1 () if 1 ∈ [e2 ]
Let e1, e1 and e1 denote the maxima of eΠ1(1 eBR2 (1)) with respect to 1 for 1 ∈ [0 e2 ],
1 ∈ [e2  e2], and 1 ∈ [e2 ], respectively. The profit of firm 1 can be written in a similar way for
e2 ≤ e2 , that yields three maxima for different ranges of values for 1.
Proposition 2 If the regulated access price for the NGN is sufficiently low, the resulting NGN
coverage of the incumbent is (weakly) less than when the NGN infrastructure is not subject to any
access regulation.
Proof. For e2  e2 , we have e1 (e) = (1)−1 ³1 − 1 (e)´, e1 () = (1)−1 ³1 − 1 ()´,
and e1 (e) = (1)−1 ³e1 (e)− 1 ()´. We have e1 ≤ 1 as 1 (e) ≥ 1 (since  ≤ emax1 )
and e1 = 1 . Furthermore, we have e1 ≤ 1 if e1 (e) ≤ 1 (), and the opposite otherwise.
Since e1 (e) is increasing with e, we have e1 (e) ≤ 1 () if e is sufficiently low (and
e1 (e)  1 () otherwise). Similarly, for e2 ≤ e2 , in two out of three equilibrium candidates
the equilibrium coverage is less than if there were no NGN access offer, and in the third equilibrium
candidate, it is less if e is sufficiently low.
Note that with the introduction of the NGN access offer, the business migration effect (which
is present in determining 1 in the absence of NGN regulation) disappears. Indeed, migration now
takes place at the wholesale level, through the entrant’s switch to the NGN access offer, which
automatically triggers the migration at the retail level.
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The following table shows how the candidate equilibria that we determined in Section 3 compare
in the presence of an NGN wholesale offer, for e2  e2 .37
Table 3: The effect of an NGN wholesale offer
on total coverage (case e2  e2 )
Without wholesale offer With wholesale offer
{1 2 }  {e1 e2 }
{2  2 }  {e2  e2 }©1  1ª = ©e1  e1ª
{2 2}  {e2 e2}
{1  2} ≷ {e1  e2}
As we summarize in Table 3, the introduction of a wholesale offer on monopoly NGNs leads to
a lower total coverage, except in two cases: (i) when the equilibrium corresponds to the optimal
“mimicking” equilibrium
©e1  e1ª, in which case the equilibrium does not depend on the access
price of the NGN, and (ii) when the equilibrium coverage is large (i.e., {e1  e2}), if e is sufficiently
high.
The regulator’s decision
We finally analyze the regulator’s choice of the access price on the new technology network, e, and
the relationship between the socially optimal access price on the NGN, e∗, and .
If the equilibrium is symmetric, since no firm has a monopolistic NGN infrastructure, there is
no access to the NGN, and therefore, the choice of e is irrelevant.
37The analysis is similar for the case where 2  2 . In the two first candidate equilibria, {1 2 } and {1 2 },
total coverage is reduced upon the introduction of a wholesale NGN offer. However, in the third candidate equilibrium,
{1  2}, total coverage decreases if  is sufficiently low, and can increase otherwise.
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If the equilibrium is asymmetric, and if the incumbent invests in larger NGN coverage than the
entrant, we find that there is a positive relationship between the socially optimal e and the access
price of the legacy network, i.e., e∗ ≥ 0.38 On the other hand, if the entrant invests in larger
NGN coverage than the incumbent, the relationship between e∗ and  can be reversed, that is, we
can have e∗ ≤ 0.39
The intuition is that the OGN access price affects the trade-off for the regulator between setting
a high NGN access price, which increases marginally the NGN coverage, and setting a low NGN
access price, which limits the deadweight loss in the areas with a monopoly NGN infrastructure.
How the OGN access price affects the regulator’s trade-off between a low and a high NGN access
price depends also on whether the incumbent or the entrant owns the NGN infrastructure subject
to access.
When the incumbent owns the monopoly NGN infrastructure, raising the access price of the
legacy network has three effects, which all gives the incentive to the regulator to increase the
NGN access price. First, a higher OGN access price reduces the size of the area with a monopoly
NGN infrastructure, as it intensifies the wholesale revenue effect, hence reducing the incumbent’s
investment incentives. This, in turn, reduces the deadweight associated to a high NGN access price
in the areas with the monopoly NGN. Second, a higher OGN access price reduces welfare in the
areas not covered by an NGN. Hence, the regulator has an incentive to expand marginally the
areas covered by an NGN and to reduce the uncovered areas where retail prices tend to increase.
Third, the frontier between the uncovered areas and the areas with a monopoly NGN becomes
more sensitive to the NGN access price; this also gives an incentive to the regulator to increase the
NGN access price to encourage investment. All in all, when the incumbent is the “leader” in the
38Note that this result holds if the marginal investment cost is convex, and it does not always hold when the
marginal investment cost is concave.
39This holds when the marginal investment cost is convex. See Appendix F for the formal proofs.
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deployment of the NGN, the socially optimal NGN access price is positively related to the OGN
access price.
When the entrant owns the monopoly NGN infrastructure, a higher OGN access price increases
the entrant’s investment incentives because the replacement effect is softened. Since the size of the
areas with the monopoly NGN increases, the regulator has an incentive to lower the NGN access
price to reduce the deadweight loss in these areas. At the same time, the marginal gain of rolling
out an NGN in uncovered areas can either increase or decrease, which gives the incentive to the
regulator to either increase or decrease the NGN access price. Finally, the frontier between the
uncovered areas and the areas with a monopoly NGN becomes less sensitive to the NGN access
price, which gives an incentive to the regulator to decrease the NGN access price. In sum, when
the OGN access price increases, the regulator should either lower or increase the NGN access price.
Hence, the relation between the socially optimal NGN access price and the OGN access price can
be negative, when the entrant is the “leader” in NGN investments.
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5 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the incentives to migrate from an “old” technology to a “new” one, and how
this migration process is affected by the interplay between wholesale conditions imposed to grant
access to third parties to one or both of these technologies. Our application is related to the
transition that we observe in the telecommunications industry, from the use of the old generation
network (OGN, i.e., the legacy network) to a new generation network (NGN, i.e., a high-speed
broadband infrastructure), but the framework we develop is general and can be applied to every
regulated market where infrastructure investment in new technology should be associated with a
transitory period of the coexistence of different technologies whose access is subject to different
types of ex-ante intervention.
In developing a general model of transition from an “old” to a “new” infrastructure, we first
analyze the firms’ (both entrant and incumbent) incentives to invest in a new technology as a
function of the wholesale price set by a regulator on the old technology. Then, we consider the
case in which a firm (the incumbent or the entrant) with a monopolistic new infrastructure is also
obliged to grant access to its new infrastructure, which enables us to analyze the interplay between
different access prices of different (old versus new) infrastructures.
The analysis highlights the presence of three conflicting effects on investment incentives: (i) a
replacement effect that reduces investment incentives of alternative operators when the access fee
to existing infrastructure is low; (ii) a wholesale revenue effect that is related to the profitability
of the access services on the “old” infrastructure and that in turn affects the incentive to invest
in the new technology; and finally (iii) a new effect — that we refer to as the “business migration
effect” — that creates a link between the wholesale and retail prices of the “old” infrastructure and
in turn impacts retail prices on the new infrastructure: if the access price of the OGN is low, retail
prices based on that network are also low and hence, in order to encourage customers to switch
32
from the “old” legacy network to the “new” network, operators should also offer low prices for
NGN services; this effect reduces the profitability of the new technology infrastructure, and hence,
the incentives to invest in it. The coexistence of these multiple effects creates a non-monotonic
relationship between the access price and investments in the new technology (i.e., in the coverage
of the new infrastructure).
From a social point of view, we show that, when setting the access price on the legacy network,
the regulator must take into account potential conflicts between investment incentives, static ef-
ficiency in uncovered areas, and excessive duplication of infrastructure costs. We also point out
that the effects that emerge when both the old and new infrastructures are subject to ex ante in-
tervention. The analysis shows that extending regulation to the new technology negatively affects
investments. More interestingly, our results highlight that regulators cannot treat the two access
prices to the two different technologies independently.
Our results show that, when the incumbent has larger NGN coverage than the entrant, the
regulator has to set an access price for the new infrastructure that is positively correlated with the
access price of the legacy network. Hence, if the regulator wants to keep the access prices of the
“old” network relatively low, in order to favor migration at wholesale level (and in turn at the retail
level), it also must set a relatively low access price on the new technology. Whereas the reverse can
be true if the entrant has larger NGN coverage than the incumbent: given the relative advantage
the incumbent enjoys due to its control over the old technology, it could be socially optimal for the
regulator to set a low access price on the old network to “level” the playing field between the two
competitors in the uncovered areas, but also to set a higher access price on the NGN infrastructure
controlled by the entrant in order to incentivize investment by both the entrant and the incumbent.
In policy terms, our result suggests that, because the legacy network is an essential facility
controlled by the incumbent, to the extent that the access price of the legacy network affects
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investments in NGN by both the incumbent and the entrant, the regulation of access to NGNs
should be somehow asymmetric, that is, access prices of incumbents’ and entrants’ NGNs should
be set following different principles according to the relative market position (in terms of NGN
coverage) of each competitor.
Our general framework is suitable to be extended in different directions. First, it might be
interesting to analyze the impact of demand and/or cost uncertainty on the incentives to migrate.
We expect that if the demand uncertainty on the new technology is large, then the access conditions
to the legacy and the new networks should take into account such an effect, leading to an increase
in the wholesale prices. Second, in our setting each operator plays only once, whereas in reality
this interaction is more dynamic. Migration per se is also a time-dependent process. Finally, access
conditions to the new technology may differ across areas: in some areas the entrant might be
interested in investing whatever the incumbent invests in, while in other areas the entrant might be
more in favour of renting the incumbent’s network. Regulatory rules, as well as the relationship to
economic conditions for accessing the old technology network, might therefore be different across
areas. We leave all these potential extensions to future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A: A competitive setting
We use the competitive setting in Katz and Shapiro (1985). The indirect utility function of a
consumer of type  is
 =  +  − ,
where  and  denote the quality and price of firm , with  = 1 2. Consumers’ types are uniformly
distributed over (−∞ 1].40 Firms set quantities, and we normalize marginal costs to zero. The
quality of the “old” network is denoted by , and the quality of the “new” network is denoted by
 . Therefore, we have  =  or  , for  = 1 2. Finally, we assume that    and that
  1+ 2. The latter assumption ensures that a firm using the old network is not evicted by a
firm using the new network.
If both firm 1 and firm 2 are active in equilibrium, their quality-adjusted prices are the same,
that is, we have 1 − 1 = 2 − 2 = b. The marginal consumer has valuation  = b, and hence,
from the uniform distribution assumption, the total demand is given by  = 1+ 2 = 1− b. Firm
1’s profit writes
1 = 11 + 2,
whereas firm 2’s profit writes
1 = (2 − ) 2,
where  = 0 if firm 2 operates a “new” network. Each firm  = 1 2 maximizes its profit  with
respect to . We look for the perfect equilibrium of this quantity-setting game. We give below the
40Allowing for negative values of  avoids corner solutions where all consumers purchase one of the two firms’
goods.
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equilibrium profits in each possible configuration.
Both firms use the “old” network. We have
1 () = 19
¡
(1 + )2 + 5 (1− ) + 5¢ and 2 () = (1 +  − 2)29 .
Note that 2 () ≥ 0 if and only if  ≤  =
¡
1 + ¢ 2. Besides, we have b = argmax 1 () =¡
1 + ¢ 2 = .
Firm 1 operates a “new” network, firm 2 uses the “old” network. We have
1 () = (1 + 2
 − )2 + 5 (1− ) + ( + 4)
9
and 2 () = (1 + 2
 −  − 2)2
9
.
Note that 2 () ≥ 0 if and only if  ≤  =
¡
1 + 2 − ¢ 2, and that    as   .
We have b = argmax 1 () = (5 +  + 4)10, and b   .
Firm 1 uses the “old” network, firm 2 operates a “new” network. We have
1 = (1 + 2
 − )2
9
and 2 = (1 + 2
 − )2
9
.
Both firms operate a “new” network. We have
1 = (1 + 
)2
9
and 2 = (1 + 
 )2
9
.
This competitive model satisfies the assumptions of our general setting.
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Assumption 1. From the expressions of profits, Assumption 1(i) is satisfied, as we have
2 ()  ≤ 0, for  =  . Assumption 1(ii) is also satisfied. Indeed, 1 () is increasing
with , for all  ≤ b = . Similarly, 1 () is increasing with , for all  ≤  . Indeed, we
have 21 () 2  0 and 1 () 
¡ = ¢ = 2 ¡ − ¢ 3  0.
Assumption 2. First, since 1 () is increasing in , we have
1 () ≥ 1 (0) =
¡
1 + ¢2
9
.
Since    , we have also 1 
¡
1 + ¢2 9, and hence, 1 ()  1 .
Second, since 1 () is increasing with  for all  ≤  , we have 1 () ≥ 1 (0) =
(1 + 2 − )29. As   , we have then 1 ()  (1 +  )29 = 1 .
Finally, with this setting, we find that  () = ¡ − ¢  ¡1 +  − ¢, and therefore,  is
increasing with  and  , and decreasing with .
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 1
For a given , if 2 − 2 ()  2 − 2 (), then 2  2 is true for all  ≥ 1 and  ≥ 0,
hence, we have  = 0. Now, note that (1)−1 is an increasing function, as 1 (·) is also an increasing
function. Therefore, if 2 −2 () ≤ 2 −2 (), we have 2  2 if and only if    (),
where  () is defined by
 () = 

2 − 2 ()
2 − 2 ()
− 1 ≥ 0.
Appendix C: Proof of Lemma 2
To begin with, assume that 1 ≤ 2 . If 2 ≥ 1, firm 2’s profit is maximized for 2 = 2 (since
1 ≤ 2 ). If 2 ≤ 1 , since 2  2 ≥ 1, then firm 2’s profit is maximum at 2 = 1. By continuity,
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the global maximum is therefore 2 = 2 . Similarly, if 1  2, firm 2’s profit is maximized at
2 = 2. Finally, consider the case where 1 ∈ (2  2]. Since 1 ≤ 2, then firm 2’s profit is
increasing with 2 for all 2 ≤ 1. Besides, since 2  2 , then firm 2’s profit is decreasing with 2
for all 2  1. Therefore, firm 2’s profit is maximized at 2 = 1.
Appendix D: Proof of Lemma 3
If 1 ≤ 2, the entrant is willing to mimic the incumbent’s investment in the areas [0 1] and
to invest in a monopoly NGN infrastructure in the areas between 2 and 2 . Hence, we have
BR2 (1) = 2 . On the other hand, if 1  2 , since 2 ≤ 2 , the entrant is willing to mimic the
incumbent’s investment only in the areas between 0 and 2, and hence, we have BR2 (1) = 2.
If 1 ∈ (2 2 ), firm 2’s best-response is necessarily a coverage 2 such that 2 ∈ [2 2 ], as
firm 2 is willing to cover at least 2 and at most 2 . Firm 2’s profit then writes
Π2 = 22 + (1 − 2)2 () + ( − 1)2 ()− 2 (2 1) , (9)
if 2 ∈ [2 1] and
Π2 = 12 + (2 − 1)2 + ( − 2)2 ()− 2 (2 1) , (10)
if 2 ∈ [1 2 ].
If 2 ≤ 1, (9) is maximized at 2 = 2, by the definition of 2. Similarly, by the definition of
2 , (10) is maximized at 2 = 2 . Therefore, the entrant trades off between setting 2 and 2 . It
sets 2 = 2 if and only if Π2 (2) ≥ Π2 (2 ), where
Π2 (1 2) = 22 + (1 − 2)2 () + ( − 1)2 ()− 1 + 1 (

2) ,
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and
Π2 (12 ) = 12 + (2 − 1)2 + ( − 2 )2 ()− 1 + 1 (

2)−  (1 (2 )− 1 (2)) .
Rearranging these expressions, we have Π2 (1 2) ≥ Π2 (1 2 ), that is, firm 2’s best-response is
to set 2 = 2, if and only if
³
2 − 2 + 2 − 2
´
1 ≤  (1 (2 )− 1 (2))+2
³
2 − 2
´
−2
³
2 − 2
´

Now, note that for 1 = 2, firm 2’s best-response is 2 , whereas for 1 = 2 , firm 2’s best-
response is 2. Therefore, the condition holds for 1 = 2 and does not hold for 1 = 2. Besides,
the left-hand side in the above inequality is continuous and increasing with 1 as 2 − 2 −³
2 − 2
´
≥ 0, since 2 ≤ 2 . This shows that there exists b1 ∈ [2 2 ] such that BR2 (1) =
2 if 1 ≤ b1, and BR2 (1) = 2 otherwise.
Appendix E: Welfare analysis for the example setting
Computation of social welfare. We denote by 1 and 2 the qualities offered by firm 1 and firm
2, respectively, and we assume that firm 2 pays an access price  to firm 1 (possibly 0). Consumer
surplus then writes
 =
Z 1

( − b∗)  ,
where b∗ = ∗1− 1 = ∗2− 2 is the quality-adjusted price at the equilibrium of the quantity-setting
subgame and e = b∗ is the marginal consumer. We find that
 = (2 + 1 + 2 − )
2
18
.
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The social welfare is then defined by  =  + 1 + 2, and we have
 = (4 + 42 + ) (2 + 22 − )
18
+
11
18
(1 − 2)2 + 4
9
(+ 1 + 2) (1 − 2) .
The social welfare decreases with the access price when both firms use the old tech-
nology. When firm 1 and firm 2 both use the old technology, we have 1 = 2 = , and we find
that

 = −
+ ¡1 + ¢
9
 0.
Private versus social investment incentives.
(i)  −  () − 1 (∗ ()) − 2 (∗ ()  ∗ ())  0. Note that  −  () −
1 (∗ ()) − 2 (∗ ()  ∗ ()) becomes lower if ∗ becomes higher. Therefore, it suffices to show
that  −  () − 1 (∗ ()) − 2 (∗ ()  ∗ ())  0 is true for the highest value of ∗,
that is, ∗ = 2. From the definition of 2, we have 2 (2 2) = 2 − 2 (). Besides,
since {2 2} is a corner equilibrium, we have 1 (2) ≤ 1 − 1 (since the incumbent’s
profit is increasing for 1 ≤ 2). Therefore,  −  () − 1 (∗ ()) − 2 (∗ ()  ∗ ()) ≥
 −  ()−
³
2 − 2 ()
´
−
³
1 − 1
´
≡ ∆1. We find that
∆1 = 1
18
¡−2 + (4 + 8 − 4) + 2( − )(2 + 3 − )¢ .
Since ∆1|=0  0 and ∆1|=  0, and ∆1 ( = 0)  0, then ∆1  0 is true for all .
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(ii)  ()− ()−1 (1 )  0. From the definition of 1 , we have 1 (1 ) = 1 ()−
1 () . We find that
 ()−  ()−
³
1 ()− 1 ()
´
=
1
6
¡ − ¢ ¡ −  + 2¢  0.
(iii) − ()−2 (2 ()  1 )  0. From the definition of 2, we have 2 (2 ()  1 ) =
2 − 2 (). We find that
 − ()−
³
2 − 2 ()
´
=
1
6
³
32 − 2 ¡1 + ¢− ¡ − ¢2´ ≡ ∆2.
 is a second-degree polynomial with an inverted bell-shape, and we have ∆2|=0  0 and
∆2 ( = 0)  0. Besides, we have ∆2 ¡ = ¢  0. Therefore, ∆2  0 always holds, and hence,
 −  ()− 2 (2 ()  1 )  0.
(iv)  − ()− 2 (2 ()  1) can be either positive or negative. From the defi-
nition of 2 , we have 2 (2 ()  1) = 2 − 2 (). We find that
 −  ()−
³
2 − 2 ()
´
=
1
6
³
32 + ¡ − ¢2 − 2 ¡1 + ¢´ ≡ ∆3.
If  is close to 0, then  −  () −
³
2 − 2 ()
´
 0. On the other hand, assume
that  ' . Then  −  () −
³
2 − 2 ()
´
'  ¡3− 2 ¡1 + ¢¢ 6  0 as  ¡
1 + ¢ 2.
44
Appendix F: Regulator’s choice of the access price on the NGN
To begin with, we consider that the incumbent invests more than the entrant; the equilibrium
coverage are ∗1 = e1 (e) and ∗2 = e2 (e). The social welfare writes
 = e2 (e) + (e1 (e)− e2 (e)) (e) + ( − e1 (e)) ()−1 (e1 )− 2 (e2 e1 ) ,
and assuming an interior solution, the socially optimal access price for the NGN solves

e = e2 (e)e ¡ − (e)− 2 (e2 e1 )¢+ e1 (e)e ¡ (e)−  ()− 1 (e1 )¢
+(e1 − e2)  (e)e ≡  (e) = 0.
Let e denote the solution of  (e) = 0. From the implicit function theorem, provided that the
second-order condition holds, the sign of e has the same sign as 2e. We find that
sign
∙e

¸
= sign
∙ 2
e
¸
= sign
∙2e1 (e)
e ¡ (e)−  ()− 1 (e1 )¢
−e1 (e)e
µ ()
 +
e1
 (1)
0 (e1 )¶+
+
e1

 (e)
e
¸
.
The second term is positive as e1 e ≥ 0,  ()  ≤ 0, e1  ≤ 0 and (1)0 () ≥ 0.
The third term is also positive as e1  ≤ 0 and  (e) e ≤ 0. Assuming that  (e)−
 ()− 1 (e1 ) ≥ 0, the first term is positive if 2e1 (e)  e ≥ 0. We find that
2e1 (e)
e =
1
1 (1)00
h
(1)−1
³e1 − 1 ´i³
(1)0
h
(1)−1
³e1 − 1 ´i´3 ≥ 0,
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as e1 e ≥ 0 and 1  ≥ 0, and provided that (1)00 ≥ 0 (i.e., the investment cost is
convex). It follows that e ≥ 0.
Now, we consider that the entrant invests more than the incumbent; the equilibrium coverage
are ∗1 = e1 (e) and ∗2 = e2 (e). The social welfare writes
 = e1 + (e2 − e1) (e) + ( − e2 ) ()− 1 (e1)− 2 (e2  e1) .
Assuming an interior solution, the socially optimal access price for the NGN solves the first-order
condition

e = e1 (e)e ¡ −  (e)− 1 (e1 (e))¢+ e2 (e)e ¡ (e)−  ()− 2 (e2  e1)¢
+(e2 − e1)  (e)e ≡  (e) = 0.
Let e denote the solution of  (e) = 0. From the implicit function theorem, provided that the
second-order condition holds, the sign of e has the same sign as 2e. We find that
sign
∙e

¸
= sign
∙ 2
e
¸
= sign
∙2e2 (e)
e ¡ (e)−  ()− 2 (e2 )¢
−e2 (e)e
µ ()
 +
e2
 (2)
0 (e2 )¶+
+
e2

 (e)
e
¸
.
As e1 e ≥ 0, the second term is negative if  () + e2  × (2)0 (e2 ) ≥ 0, and we
assume that this is the case. The third term is always negative as e2  ≥ 0 and  (e) e ≤
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0. Finally, assuming that  (e)−  ()− 2 (e2 ) ≥ 0, the first term is negative as
2e2 (e)
e =
2
2 (2)00
h
(2)−1
³e2 − 2 ´i³
(2)0
h
(2)−1
³e2 − 2 ´i´3 ≤ 0,
since e2 e ≥ 0 and 2  ≤ 0, and provided that (2)00 ≥ 0. It follows that e ≤ 0
when the entrant is the leader in NGN investments (provided that  () + e2  ×
(2)0 (e2 ) ≥ 0 and that the investment cost is convex).
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